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Abstract
We develop a framework for using text as data in asset pricing models. We use the
framework to test whether real estate agents exploit their informational advantage
to sell properties they own for a premium. Consistent with the previous literature,
baseline estimates that exclude textual information indicate agents sell their own house
at a 3 to 4 percent premium in both Phoenix, AZ and Atlanta, GA. However, this
premium dissipates when textual information is included. The results suggest that
the baseline estimates suffer from an omitted variable bias, which previous studies
incorrectly ascribe to market distortions associated with asymmetric information.
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1 Introduction
Information encoded in text can provide a rich complement to more traditional forms of
data. However, its high-dimensional nature precludes statistical inference using standard
econometric techniques (Gentzkow et al., 2017). The purpose of this study is to develop a
framework for using text as data in asset pricing models. We use a LASSO-type double-
selection method to select relevant words and phrases (tokens) from unstructured text and
then include these tokens directly in the asset pricing model.1 We show that including the
textual information expands the researcher’s information set to better reflect the information
set of the market participants and, in doing so, has a significant effect on pricing estimates.
Although the framework we present is applicable to any asset class, we demonstrate its
efficacy in the pricing of residential real estate. More specifically, we test for asymmetric
information among market participants in residential real estate. Direct tests of asymmetric
information present identification challenges given the difficulty in observing and measuring
the heterogeneity of information among market participants (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012).
The few real estate studies that do test for asymmetric information attempt to address the
identification problems using indirect information variables that identify market participants
who likely have an informational advantage. For example, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003)
use professionally brokered transactions, Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008) use agent-owned transactions, and Kurlat and Stroebel (2015) use three measures of
seller composition. The use of indirect information variables is necessary because researchers’
have incomplete information which, by definition, makes it impossible to measure the hetero-
geneity of information among market participants. A natural concern is that the coefficient
on the indirect information variable is biased when the indirect information variables are
correlated with omitted variables.
The extant literature focuses on differential information between market participants
even though the studies cannot determine whether an informational advantage (i) actually
1LASSO is an acronym for least absolute shrinkage and selection operator.
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exists, (ii) can be exploited for a financial gain, or (iii) the estimated mispricing effect is
related to an omitted variable bias. Recognizing these limitations, we focus on incorporating
textual information into the asset pricing model to more closely align the information set in
the asset pricing model with the information set of the market participants involved in the
transaction. We show that textual information offers a rich complement to structured data
and that not including it in the asset pricing model results in an omitted variable bias.
Textual analysis is not a new concept in finance and economics.2 However, several factors
have prevented its widespread use. Most notably, numeric representations of text are not
readily available to the researcher. To overcome this obstacle researchers typically specify,
ex-ante, a dictionary of words that are associated with a given topic or sentiment and then
map the text into a numeric index using the dictionary. However, as Loughran and Mcdonald
(2011) note dictionaries are not universally applicable because words that imply a positive
tone in general can imply a neutral or negative tone in a specific context. For example,
charming and cozy are positive words in the widely used Harvard IV-4 Dictionary, but they
are euphemisms for smaller, old-fashioned houses in a real estate context.
We create a real estate specific dictionary using the remarks section of the multiple
listing service (MLS). The listing agent, who is the only professional to enter and evaluate
the interior of the house, uses the remarks section to provide a description of the property
that complements the information reported in the standard MLS data fields.3 Given its
limited length, listing agents use the remarks section to highlight important information
such as the condition and quality of the property, motivation (if any) of the seller, purchase
2Tetlock (2007) and Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) are early examples of textual analysis in the finance
literature. The bulk of the literature focuses on the impact of textual information on equity valuations.
However, more recent studies have used textual information to examine topics such as financial constraints
(Hoberg and Maksimovic 2014; Bodnaruk et al. 2015; Buehlmaier and Whited 2018). See Loughran and
McDonald (2016) for a recent survey of textual analysis in both finance and accounting.
3Even appraisers who play a critical role in lenders’ underwriting decisions rely on MLS listing information.
For example, Young (2012) states that “today’s appraisers are required to rate property conditions of both
subject properties and comparables using a numerical scale from C1 to C6. Where do they get the information
needed to make these ratings? Typically from the information that is provided in the MLS listing by the
listing agent, including photos, remarks, and descriptions of physical features found in the various fields for
listing input. As appraisers rely on the information found in the MLS, the more descriptive and accurate
that information is, the better appraisal reports can be.”
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incentives, and/or neighborhood amenities that are not clearly conveyed in other areas of the
listing. We show that the remarks include both positive and negative information about the
time-varying and time-invariant features of the house and neighborhood. We also show that
the remarks include information that is correlated with the indirect information variables
(e.g. agent-owned transactions) used in previous research, so estimates of the mispricing
effects of asymmetric information are likely biased in the extant literature.4
Creating a real estate specific dictionary is complicated by the fact that the remarks
section of the MLS contains tens of thousands of tokens, thereby rendering conventional
variable selection methods computationally infeasible. Nowak and Smith (2017) overcome
this issue using a LASSO-type single-selection method to create a dictionary that strongly
predicts property prices. Single-selection variable selection methods, including the LASSO,
select variables based on their ability to predict a single dependent variable; because of this,
variables that have a low predictive power but are correlated with the variable of interest
may be omitted from the pricing model, resulting in an omitted variable bias. In contrast,
double-selection variable selection methods identify variables that are strong predictors of
the dependent variable and/or the variable of interest. The double-selection procedure we
use, which relies heavily on Belloni et al. (2014), is computationally feasible and allows for
valid statistical inference on the coefficient of interest.
The double-selection method selects over 1,000 tokens for our real estate specific dic-
tionary. In contrast, Levitt and Syverson (2008) use a dictionary of 61 words and phrases.
This difference in the number of tokens reflects the value of machine learning and other high-
dimensional methods rather than the limitation of pre-defined dictionaries. This is not too
surprising as King et al. (2017) find that humans perform poorly when creating dictionaries
from scratch, yet perform well when associating words.
After creating the real estate specific dictionary, we use it to examine agent-owned trans-
4A textual description of the property was not available in every study. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003)
used commercial real estate data and Kurlat and Stroebel (2015) used tax assessor data, so they did not
have access to the textual information used in this study. Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008) used MLS data, so they had access to the textual information.
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actions in a residential real estate setting. Agent-owned transactions offer a rare example of
a clean identification strategy. When real estate agents list a property they own on the MLS,
they are required by law to notify potential buyers that the owner of the property holds a
real estate license.5 The seminal studies by Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008) argue that real estate agents have better information than their clients and exploit
their informational advantage to sell their own house for a higher price than a comparable
client-owned house. However, both studies also note that agent-owned houses may system-
atically differ from those of their clients and report their findings with a caveat that the
agent-owned estimates may suffer from an omitted variable bias. For example, Rutherford
et al. (2005) note “another possible explanation is that owner-agents initially buy higher
quality properties” while Levitt and Syverson (2008) state “a particular concern. . . is that
agents live in houses that are especially attractive along dimensions that are difficult to
observe or quantify.” Although we disagree that these dimensions are difficult to observe,
we certainly agree that this information is difficult to quantify. In any event, we address
these concerns by including salient textual information from the remarks in the asset pricing
model.
Sans textual information, we estimate a 3 to 4 percent premium for agent-owned trans-
actions in Atlanta, Georgia and Phoenix, Arizona. These naive estimates are similar to
those reported in Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008). However, after
we incorporate the textual information the premium drops to 1.7 percent in Phoenix and is
no longer statistically significant in Atlanta. We also find that the agent-owned estimate is
statistically insignificant in Phoenix during the pre-boom (2000-2003) and bust (2007-2009)
subperiods using a restricted subsample that limits the variability in location and physical
characteristics.
Our empirical results have several important implications. Contrary to previous studies,
5For example, Rule 520-1-.09 (8) of Georgia’s Administrative Code states that “A licensee shall not
advertise to sell, buy, exchange, rent, or lease real estate in a manner indicating that the offer to sell, buy,
exchange, rent, or lease such real estate is being made by a private party not licensed by the Commission.”
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we find that agents do not necessarily sell their own house for more than comparable client-
owned houses. This suggests that agents do not use their informational advantage to exploit
the principals they represent. We also find that including the textual information from the
remarks in the asset pricing model explains a large portion of the naive agent-owned premium
that previous studies attributed to asymmetric information. These findings highlight the
difficulty in testing for information asymmetry using incomplete information.
The plan of our analysis is as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and methodology
that we employ while Section 3 describes the data employed in the empirical analysis. Section
4 presents our results inclusive of robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Estimation
2.1 Omitted Variable Bias in Asset Pricing
Implicitly, a home buyer and seller negotiate a sales price based on a set of property attributes
that are common knowledge and observable to all parties, X. We use the term property-
observable when referring to this set of attributes. X includes both objective (e.g. square
feet living area, number of bathrooms, and age) and subjective (e.g. condition, quality and
character) attributes of the house and neighborhood. Home buyers learn about X by visiting
the property, reviewing property improvement and tax records, hiring a professional home
inspector, and consulting with their real estate agent.6 In this sense, X is fully revealed
to both the buyer and seller, so there is no information asymmetry between the market
participants.7
6Sales price is also determined by buyer-specific or seller-specific attributes, including expectations and
motivation, that are unobserved by the other party. Of course, the home buyer has insight into the home
seller’s motivation if the information is included in the agent’s remark (e.g. an agent may note that the seller
is “highly motivated”).
7Relative to real estate agents, home buyers are infrequent, uninformed market participants who transact
in the housing market, on average, once every ten years. Thus, we recognize that the seller likely has an
information advantage if they are a real estate agent (i.e. agent-owned transactions). However, because we
have incomplete information we cannot estimate the magnitude of the agents’ information advantage or test
whether the advantage can be exploited for financial gain. For these reasons we focus on incorporating the
5
The term observable often takes on a different meaning in academic research. First,
researchers may use the term observable when referring to the set of attributes available
in the data set, XD. We use the term data-observable when referring to XD. Because
researchers work with incomplete information, the term data-observable generally refers to a
subset of the property’s property-observable attributes, XD ⊆ X. For example, a property
might have an unpleasant view that is not recorded anywhere in the data set. However, this
view is easily observed when visiting the property.
Second, researchers may use the term observable when referring to the set of attributes
used as explanatory variables in a hedonic model, XM . We use the term model-observable
when referring to XM . The model-observable variables are often a subset of the afore-
mentioned data-observable attributes, XM ⊆ XD ⊆ X. For example, although the public
remarks section is available in most MLS data sets and is data-observable, the information
contained in the remarks is generally not included in the hedonic pricing model.
In this study, we focus on two types of omitted variables: data-omitted and model-
omitted. Data-omitted variables refer to the set of property attributes that are property-
observable, but not data-observable. The data-omitted variables can be written as X \XD.
In contrast, model-omitted variables refer to the set of property attributes that are (i) data-
observable, but not model-observable and (ii) contribute to the price of the property in a
non-trivial manner. When every variable in XD contributes to the price of the property, the
model-omitted variables can be written as XD \XM .
Data-omitted variable bias can result from measurement difficulties. Two of the most
difficult to measure attributes in real estate are the condition and the quality of the house.
Condition refers to a time-varying measure of the house’s maintenance and upkeep, and
quality refers to a time-invariant measure of the workmanship and materials used in its con-
struction. Researchers have long recognized that condition and quality are likely correlated
with variables of interest. When this occurs, the coefficient estimate for the variable of inter-
textual information that is available to all market participants in the asset pricing model.
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est suffers from an omitted variable bias. Thus, if condition and quality are correlated with
agent-owned houses, the estimated price effect for agent-owned transactions will be upward
(downward) biased if agent-owned houses are, on average, in better (worse) condition and/or
of higher (lower) quality.
Data-omitted variable bias can also result from data collection limitations. For example,
it is easy to measure the number of fireplaces in a house, identify if the kitchen was remodeled,
or determine if the property has premium landscaping. However, the cost of measuring and
recording these attributes can be prohibitively expensive when the number of properties
is large, the attributes are time-varying, and resources are finite. For this reason, many
data sets maintained at the county or municipality level include a limited set of property
attributes, many of which are time-invariant or nearly time-invariant.
Unlike county or municipality authorities, real estate agents visit and observe the property
in person prior to listing it for sale in the MLS. As a result, data sets that real estate
professionals maintain include a more comprehensive set of time-varying and time-invariant
property-observable attributes. For example, real estate agents indicate whether recent
capital improvements, such as a remodeled kitchen, have been made to the property. If
the researcher does not observe these capital improvements (data-omitted) and the capital
improvements are correlated with agent-owned properties, then the agent-owned coefficient
estimate suffers a data-omitted variable bias. If the researcher does observe the capital
improvements but does not include this information in the model (model-omitted), then the
agent-owned coefficient will suffer a model-omitted variable bias. In either event, if agent-
owned properties are more likely to have capital improvements, the agent-owned coefficient
estimate is upward biased.
To eliminate or at least mitigate model-omitted variable bias, we incorporate textual
information provided by the listing agent in the remarks section of the MLS. The information
we incorporate is present in most, if not all, MLS data sets and is therefore data-observable.
The unstructured nature of the text does not immediately lend itself to a form that can be
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readily incorporated in a hedonic pricing model; for this reason, information in the remarks
is almost always model-omitted. The following sections describe a practical and flexible
approach to incorporate textual information into a hedonic pricing model.
2.2 Textual Analysis and Agent Remarks
Considerable variation in sales price often exists among properties that are identical in terms
of listing period, location, bedrooms and bathrooms. Take, for example, the transactions in
Table 1 which includes two three bedroom, two bathroom houses that are approximately the
same size, located in the same census tract, and sold within two weeks of each other. Despite
their structural and locational similarities, their sales price varies considerably. Notice that
information in the remarks can be used to explain some of the within group sales price
variation. For example, the more expensive house has a fully remodeled bath. In contrast, the
less expensive house is an opportunity for investment that needs cosmetic work. This simple
example highlights the property-observable textual information contained in the remarks
and the need to include it in the asset pricing model.
Although the remarks contain textual information about the property, it is not imme-
diately apparent how the researcher can use the text as data in a hedonic pricing model.
One approach is to use one or more pre-specified topic dictionaries to represent the remarks
numerically. Topic dictionaries for positivity, negativity, and readability include words com-
monly associated with their respective subject matter. An index for a given text can be
computed as a weighted average of the counts of words present in the text that belong to
one or more topic dictionaries. For example, a simple sentiment index can be calculated as
the difference in the fraction of positive and negative words in a text. The index can then be
included in standard regression models. When using this approach, it is important to use a
dictionary that is suitable to the task at hand. That is, generic or off-the-shelf dictionaries
may provide misleading results when applied to a finance or real estate setting (Loughran
and Mcdonald, 2011).
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In practice, creating a topic dictionary from scratch requires significant up-front costs
and is likely to omit some relevant words. Noting this, we are interested in creating a
sufficient dictionary. A dictionary is sufficient if it includes a set of words and phrases that
are sufficient for valid statistical inference on the coefficient of interest. Words or phrases
not included in the sufficient dictionary may be associated with the variable of interest, but
the additional information they convey is not necessary for valid statistical inference on the
coefficient of interest.
Incorporating textual data into a regression model presents several challenges. First, in-
corporating information in the remarks requires a numeric representation of the information.
Using a common approach in the textual analysis literature, we create indicator variables
based on the presence of a given token in the remarks. Tokens refer to single words (uni-
grams), two-word phrases (bigrams), or a combination of words and phrases (flex-grams).8
Creating indicator variables in this way treats the remarks as an unordered collection of
tokens which is commonly referred to as the bag-of-words approach. Of course, the use of
bigrams and flex-grams allows the researcher to treat sets of consecutive words as a single
token.
Second, remarks are entered manually so they may contain errors or idiosyncrasies. To
mitigate the effects of misspellings, we use an open-source spell checking software to identify
and correct spelling mistakes. We also run a depluralization process that converts every
word to its singular form. In unreported results, we also consider a stemming algorithm. The
results reported are not sensitive to the inclusion of plurals or unstemmed words. Recognizing
that some of the textual information in the remarks overlaps, we also remove tokens that
are redundant for the variable of interest.9
8The flex-gram tokenization approach uses a collection of n-grams for various n. Intuitively, flex-grams
identify which words or phrases are constituent parts of larger phrases.
9We use the hunspell package to check for misspellings. Documentation is available at https:
//cran.r-project.org/web/packages/hunspell/hunspell.pdf. We use Porter’s word stemming algo-
rithm available in the SnowballC package. Documentation is available at https://cran.r-project.org/
web/packages/SnowballC/SnowballC.pdf. We provide a step-by-step overview of the tokenization process
and removal of redundant tokens in Section B of the internet appendix.
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Third, the number of unique tokens in the data can be large. Although limited to
descriptions of single-family houses, the remarks include more than 50,000 unique words
when the Phoenix and Atlanta data sets are combined. Since not all tokens are relevant for
asset pricing, it is standard practice in the textual analysis literature to eliminate tokens
based on information content and frequency. As such, we remove a set of frequent words
that convey negligible information known as stop words (i.e. a, an, the, for, and, but, etc.).
Although we use recent techniques developed for high-dimensional data, it is still necessary to
restrict the number of tokens to a manageable dimension. As such, we drop all but the 2,000
most frequent tokens. The remaining set of tokens define our candidate set of tokens. We also
experimented with sets of 3,000 or 5,000 candidate tokens and found the resulting dictionaries
and parameter estimates are comparable to the dictionary and parameter estimates when
using 2,000 candidate tokens. The variable selection process, which we describe in the next
section, is performed on the candidate set to create our dictionary.
2.3 Variable Selection with High-Dimensional Data
The procedure for creating the dictionary is quite general and can be applied in any setting
where textual information may be used to augment conventional regression methods. The
resulting dictionary is sufficient for valid asymptotic inference on a parameter of interest,
τ , associated with a binary variable of interest, d, here an indicator for agent-owned trans-
actions. In the context of a hedonic pricing model, the parameter τ is understood to be
the expected difference in log price between agent-owned transactions and non-agent-owned
transactions.
Beginning with the candidate set of K = 2, 000 tokens, a dictionary can be identified
by performing variable selection on the K tokens. Conventional likelihood based procedures
such as AIC or BIC can be used to identify Sp ⊆ {1, ..., K} as the set of Qp  K tokens that
are strong predictors of p. However, these methods have several drawbacks when K is large.
First, identifying which tokens are strong predictors using AIC or BIC is computationally
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infeasible as these methods require more than 2K=2,000 separate least-squares coefficient es-
timates.10 Second, although AIC and BIC select variables that are strong predictors of p,
a model-omitted variable bias associated with τ may still remain when the complement of
tokens not in Sp are strong predictors of d.
Noting this computational infeasibility, one approach is to use the least absolute shrinkage
and selection operator known as LASSO to select tokens (Tibshirani, 1996). The LASSO
is a penalized regression where an `1 penalty is placed on the coefficients. The shape of
this penalty yields a coefficient estimate with many elements equal to 0. Vectors with many
elements equal to 0 are known as sparse vectors. By setting some coefficient estimates equal
to 0, the LASSO performs both variable selection and coefficient estimation. By identifying
which tokens are strong predictors of p, a dictionary from a set of candidate tokens is built
using LASSO. More importantly, the penalized regression is a convex optimization problem
that is computationally feasible even when K = 2, 000 candidate tokens are considered.
However, using LASSO to select Qp tokens based on their ability to predict p does
not explicitly control for a model-omitted variable bias associated with τ . Noting this,
Belloni et al. (2014) describe a double-selection procedure to identify additional tokens that
can mitigate model-omitted variable bias. The procedure identifies an additional set Sd ⊆
{1, ..., K} of Qd tokens that may not be strong predictors of p but are strong predictors of d.
The union S2 = Sp ∪ Sd is a set of Q2 tokens that are either strong predictors of p or strong
predictors of d. These Q2 tokens can then be used as controls in a second stage regression
known as post double-selection estimation (Belloni et al., 2014).
Of course, variable selection methods are prone to variable selection errors in which S2
may not include all predictors of p or d. However, the double-selection procedure described
above identifies strong predictors of either p or d. Any tokens not in S2 are at most mildly
associated with p or d, and their omission does not lead to a significant model-omitted
variable bias. In this way, the dictionary of tokens in S2 is sufficient for valid asymptotic
10For comparison, there are approximately 1014 cells in the human body and 1080 atoms in the universe.
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inference on τ ; alternatively, the dictionary is robust to variable selection errors. However,
because S2 may omit some tokens that are weak predictors of p or d, the dictionary defined
by S2 is not a complete dictionary but rather a sufficient dictionary.
2.4 Asset Pricing Model and Double-Selection
The price of house n at time t, pnt, can be written as
pnt = xntβ + dntτ + µn + ψnt + vnt (1)
In Equation 1, xnt is a vector of time-invariant and time-varying variables selected by the
researcher, β is a vector of implicit prices, dnt is an indicator variable for agent-owned sales
transactions, τ is the price effect associated with agent-owned transactons, µn(ψnt) is a
time-varying (time-invariant) effect, and vnt is a zero-mean error term uncorrelated with
any variables xnt, dnt, µn, or ψnt. The µn and ψnt effects include both the data-omitted
and model-omitted variables. In the analysis below, xnt also includes dummy variables for
the time of sale (quarter by year), location (zip code or census tract), and time-location
interactions.
Equation 1 can be estimated using least-squares. The estimate τˆ is upward biased if
0 < E[dnt(µn+ψnt)]. For example, when µn+ψnt includes only condition and quality effects,
τˆ will be upward biased if agent-owned properties are more likely to be of higher quality or
in better condition.
To mitigate this bias, we augment Equation 1 with indicator variables for the set of
candidate tokens in the MLS remarks under the assumption that the tokens can be used
to approximate µn + ψnt. Following Nowak and Smith (2017), the tokens are interpreted
as proxies for the relevant property-observable attributes that are not included in xnt in
Equation 1. This approximation can be described as
12
wntθ =
K∑
k=1
1(tokenk ∈ remarksnt)θk (2)
pnt = xntβ + dntτ + wntθ + ent (3)
ent = µn + ψnt − wntθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
rnt
+vnt (4)
In Equation 2, wnt is a vector of indicator variables for the presence of the K candidate
tokens and θ is a vector of the implicit prices for each token. For each token, 1(tokenk) = 1
if token k is in the remarks for property n sold at time t, remarksnt, and 1(tokenk) = 0,
otherwise. Equation 3 states that price can also be written as a function of xnt, dnt, and
remarksnt plus an error term. Equation 4 states that the error in Equation 3 is the sum of
the original error term in Equation 1, vnt, plus an approximation error, rnt.
The approximation rnt reflects the inability of the tokens to perfectly capture µn + ψnt.
However, we assume that with enough tokens, we have chosen wnt such that rnt is uncor-
related with xnt or dnt. We place an `1 penalty on the implicit prices for the tokens and
identify a set of Q2 tokens by solving the following system of equations
(βˆ′p, τˆp, θˆ
′
p)
′ = arg min
β,τ,θ
∑
(pnt − xntβ − dntτ − wntθ)2 + λp
∑
k
|θkφp,k| (5)
(βˆ′d, θˆ
′
d)
′ = arg min
β,θ
∑
(dnt − xntβ − wntθ)2 + λd
∑
k
|θkφd,k| (6)
Define the index of the Qˆp non-zero coefficients in θˆp as Sˆp ∈ {1, ..., K} and similarly for Qˆd
and Sˆd. The objective function in Equation 5 is a penalized hedonic pricing model and the
objective function in Equation 6 is a penalized linear probability model.11 More importantly,
11An `1 penalized logit likelihood was also considered and yielded a Sˆd similar to that in Equation 6.
Moreover, the `1 penalized logit model is well-defined even when the data is linearly separable (Hastie et al.,
2015).
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the objective functions in Equations 5 and 6 are convex and have solutions that can be found
using numerical methods even when K is large.
The 0 ≤ λp and 0 ≤ λd are tuning parameters that control the size of the penalty. When
λp = 0, there is no penalty on θk and the solution can be found by least-squares. As λp
increases, the penalty on θk increases and θˆp is shrunk towards 0. The 0 < φp,k are token-
specific penalties that control for heteroskedasticity in ent (Belloni et al., 2012). Similarly, λd
and φd,q control the penalty in Equation 6. An `1 penalty is placed on θk in both equations.
12
The shape of this penalty results in a sparse solution where many coefficients in θˆp and θˆd
will be exactly equal to 0.
Given the objective function in Equation 5, Sˆp is a set of Qˆp tokens that best predict house
prices. Similar to other single-selection methods, there may be variables in {1, ..., K} \ Sˆp
that are correlated with dnt but are poor predictors of house price. Thus, solving Equation
5 alone may not control for omitted variable bias as the variables in Sp may not adequately
control for the omitted variable bias associated with dnt. Belloni et al. (2014) demonstrate
that the union Sˆ2 = Sˆp ∪ Sˆd yields a set of Qˆ2 tokens that can be used to control for
the omitted variable bias associated with dnt. Thus, constructing Sˆ2 requires two variable
selection procedures, which is commonly referred to as a double-selection.
The post-LASSO estimator uses the tokens in Sˆp as explanatory variables in an additional
regression (Belloni et al., 2013). Similarly, the post double-selection estimator uses only the
tokens in Sˆ2 as explanatory variables in an additional hedonic regression that includes the
variable of interest. The post double-selection estimator solves the following
(βˆ′2, τˆ2, θˆ
′
2)
′ = arg min
β,τ,θ
∑
(pnt − xntβ − dntτ − w2,ntθ)2 (7)
w2,ntθ =
∑
q∈Sˆ2
1(tokenq ∈ remarksnt)θq (8)
12The `1 length of a K × 1 vector x is ‖x‖1 =
∑
k |xk|
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In Equation 7, w2,nt is a Qˆ2 × 1 vector of indicator variables for the tokens indicated by Sˆ2,
and θˆ2 is a Qˆ2 × 1 vector of implicit prices for these tokens. Sˆ2 is the set of tokens that can
be used to (i) predict house prices and/or (ii) identify agent-owned transactions in the data.
The subset of tokens that are in Sˆ2 but not in Sˆp, Sˆ2 \ Sˆp, represent the tokens that can
mitigate the omitted variable bias associated with agent-owned transactions but, because
they do not have large predictive power for house prices, are not included when using a
single-selection method.
Theorem 2 in Belloni et al. (2014) provides conditions in which τˆ2 has an asymptotically
normal distribution. These conditions require that with high probability θˆp and θˆd are sparse
and provide good approximations to the true conditional expected values of pnt and dnt. As
emphasized in Belloni et al. (2014), valid asymptotic inference on τˆ can take place in the
presence of imperfect variable selection. That is, valid asymptotic inference is still possible
when Sˆ2 both omits some relevant tokens and includes some irrelevant tokens.
3 Data
We examine agent-owned transactions using MLS data from Atlanta, Georgia and Phoenix,
Arizona. The Georgia Multiple Listing Service (GAMLS) provided the data for Atlanta and
the Arizona Multiple Listing Service (ARMLS) provided the data for Phoenix. The GAMLS
data covers the five counties (Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett) that form the
core of metro-Atlanta. The GAMLS data set includes single-family detached houses that
were sold using the services of a real estate agent between January 2000 and September
2016.13 The Phoenix data includes all transactions in Maricopa County and Pinal County.
The two counties cover the city of Phoenix and several surrounding cities including Glendale,
Mesa, Scottsdale, and Tempe. The ARMLS data set includes single-family detached houses
that were sold using the services of a real estate agent between January 2000 and December
13The agent-owned variable was not populated in the GAMLS data until 2007, so the empirical analysis
for Atlanta includes every transaction between January 2007 and September 2016.
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2013.
Both MLS data sets contain extremely detailed information including the house’s address,
physical characteristics (e.g. square feet living area, bedrooms, and bathrooms), listing
information (e.g. agent-owned, vacant, and rental), transaction details (e.g. time-on-market
and sales price), and a text description (i.e. public remark) that the real estate agent uses
to market the house. The GAMLS data does not consistently report the square feet of living
area or lot size, so we match the properties to county tax assessor records obtained from
CoreLogic. We use the agents’ description of the property to create the remarks variable,
wnt, in Equation 2.
Prior to running the empirical analysis, we impose a number of restrictions on both
MLS data sets. We geocode the data using the property address listed in the MLS to
obtain location controls (census tract and zip code) for the empirical analysis. Records with
property addresses that did not geocode properly are dropped. Using the geocoded address
we create a unique identifier that allows us to link listing and sales activity on a given
property over time. We remove records for which data on variables of interest are missing
or contain invalid values. We also remove houses that sold more than twice within a three
year period (i.e. flipped houses) or were part of a distressed sales transaction (i.e. short sale,
foreclosure, or REO). To eliminate outliers and minimize data errors, we filter the data on
several physical characteristics. A complete list of the filters is reported in the appendix in
Section A.1. The filters are comparable to those employed in Levitt and Syverson (2008).
The results we report are not sensitive to the filters employed. Summary statistics for the
filtered Atlanta and Phoenix data sets are displayed in Table 2.
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4 Results
4.1 Variable Selection
Since the results are similar regardless of the token set employed, we only report the results
for the unigram token set unless otherwise noted. Not every token is included in the empir-
ical analysis; only tokens selected by the double-selection procedure are included as control
variables. For practical purposes, we start with a candidate set of the 2,000 most frequent
tokens.
The token selection procedures in Equation 5 and Equation 6 include additively separable
time (quarter by year) and location (zip code or census tract) fixed effects. The bulk of the
analysis uses zip code fixed effects for four reasons. First, the use of zip code fixed effects
facilitates the comparison with the extant literature on agent-owned transactions. Second,
our main conclusions are unaffected when including more granular fixed effects for either
census tract or census block group. Third, census tract fixed effects have been shown to
overfit in-sample (Nowak and Smith, 2017). Fourth, we find that zip code fixed effects are
computationally tractable.14
Several property characteristics are also included in the token selection procedure in
Equation 5 and Equation 6. Age enters into the hedonic functions linearly and indicator
variables are included for lot size, living area, bedrooms, and bathrooms. We find these
specifications allow for possibly important nonlinear relationships in the true hedonic price
function while also providing easily interpreted coefficients. Least-squares coefficient esti-
mates for the indicator variables are presented in the appendix in Tables A1 and A2.
One of the primary contributions of this study is the inclusion of w2 in Equation 7 to
control for the omitted variable bias that may be present when estimating τ using Equation 1.
14We used the hdm package in R to estimate the heteroskedastic LASSO as in Belloni et al. (2014). Com-
putation time for the heteroskedastic LASSO using a Macbook Pro with 8GB of memory and a 2.7 Ghz Intel
Core i5 was approximately 30 minutes using 2,000 candidate tokens and zip code fixed effects. Computa-
tion time on the same machine with additively separable census tract fixed effects was more than 3 hours.
Computation using multiplicatively separable census tract fixed effects was infeasible on this same machine.
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The vector w2 includes indicator variables for the tokens in Ŝ2 that represent the observable
attributes that were omitted from previous studies.15 The tokens are selected by minimizing
Equation 5 and Equation 6. Table 3 examines the variables selected for Atlanta, GA in Panel
A and Phoenix, AZ in Panel B. Using the 2,000 most frequent unigram tokens we create a
2,000 by 1 vector of indicator variables. The top part of each panel presents the correlation
between the vectors and the bottom part (i.e. last row) of each panel lists the total number
of non-zero variables that were selected.
The process selects 827 of the 2,000 candidate tokens that explain price in Ŝtractp and 386
tokens that explain the agent-owned indicator in Ŝtractd when using additively separable time
and census tract fixed effects for the Atlanta data set. In total, there are 1,064 unique tokens
from both of these sets in Ŝtract2 . When using additively separable time and zip code fixed
effects the process selects 1,057 unique tokens in Ŝzip2 . The results show that the two token
sets are highly correlated (83.4%) especially in their selection of the token set in Ŝd (99.0%).
Similar results are reported for Phoenix, AZ in Panel B. In unreported results we create
the token sets for every subperiod in Atlanta and Phoenix. The agent-owned subperiod
estimates remain the same whether we use the token set for the entire study period or the
subperiods. Thus, we only report estimates using the token set for the entire study period.
By including the indicator variables for the tokens in the least-squares estimating equa-
tion, we are able to estimate implicit prices for each token in Ŝ2. However, similar to others
in the machine learning literature, such as Mullainathan and Spiess (2017), we refrain from
a strict interpretation of these coefficient estimates as the true price associated with a given
token. If anything, we favor an interpretation similar to the inverse regression approach in
Taddy (2013) where the likelihood of the appearance of any given token in the remarks is
determined by the true condition and quality of the property. More importantly, removing
the phrase fixer upper from a description while not making any repairs to the property is
unlikely to increase its sales price.
15The tokens represent data-omitted variables in studies that used county tax assessor data and model-
omitted variables in studies that used MLS data.
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For informational purposes, Figure 1 plots the ten largest positive and negative tokens
for both Atlanta and Phoenix. The results offer some interesting insights into the variable
selection process at the zip code and census tract level. For example, five of the ten positive
unigram tokens selected using zip code fixed effects are neighborhoods in Atlanta (Collier,
Ashford, Ormewood, Grant and Walton). In contrast, only one of the ten positive tokens
selected using census tract zip code effects is a neighborhood (EAV which is short for East
Atlanta Village). This suggests that zip code fixed effects may not properly control for
unobserved variation in the characteristics of the house due to its location. The remaining
tokens are relatively intuitive. A house with a dock sells for a premium. Whereas, a house
that needs a fix or is a fixer upper sells for less. Although it is the listing agent’s job
to present the house in the best light possible, Figure 1 shows that listing agents include
both positive and negative information in the public remarks section of the MLS. This is
important, because it allows us to control for the condition and quality of the house - thereby
isolating the pricing differential on agent-owned and non-agent-owned houses.
As mentioned above, Sˆ2 includes strong predictors of both p and d. Figure 2 presents θˆp
and θˆd for bigrams in the Phoenix data.
16 For clarity, only twenty of the strongest predictors
in either Sˆp or Sˆd are presented. Properties with granite-slab or travertine-floors sell for
a higher price and are more likely to be agent-owned. In contrast, properties sold via an
estate-sale or that need-tlc (tender loving care) sell for a lower price and are less likely to
agent-owned. This finding aligns closely with Campbell et al. (2011) who find that death-
related discounts (estate-sale) reflect poor maintenance (need-tlc). Figure 2 also indicates
that tokens in Sˆp are not guaranteed to be in Sˆd. For example, remarks that have a lake-view,
are located on a golf course fairway, or have a view of the city-lights sell for a significant
premium but are not likely to be agent-owned.17
By construction, tokens in Sˆp explain large variations in transaction price, and many
16Additional insight into the bigram and flex-gram tokens that are selected is provided in Section B.5 of
the internet appendix.
17th-fairway is an artifact of the cleaning procedure where all numbers are removed from the remarks.
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of these tokens appear to be associated with time-invariant features of the property. The
predominance of new in the tokens in Sˆd but not Sˆp suggests real estate agents are more
likely to upgrade their property before sale. However, because these tokens are not in Sˆp,
these upgrades are modest in nature and not significant sources of variation in price, relative
to the property attributes mentioned in the previous paragraph. Moreover, because these
upgrades are time-varying and do not require a permit, they most likely are not included in
county tax assessor data sets.
Finally, it is important to note that the tokens in Figure 2 refer to objective, verifiable
features of the property. The only possible exception being a spectacular-view. This is im-
portant because previous studies that used a pre-specified dictionary included words related
to the subjective measure of property quality in the dictionary. For example, the dictionary
in Levitt and Syverson (2008) includes amazing, beautiful, and breathtaking while the dic-
tionary in Goodwin et al. (2014) is comprised of 17 positive words such as beautiful, cozy,
gorgeous, and lovely. Furthermore, because these features are verifiable and posted alongside
photos of the house, it is difficult for real estate agents to favorably misrepresent the house
in the remarks. Lastly, many of the words in Figure 2 would not appear in dictionaries of
positive or negative words that are not specific to real estate. This further emphasizes the
need for researchers to use a dictionary specific to the research question at hand.
4.2 Agent-Owned Estimates
When comparing agent-owned and non-agent-owned houses it’s important to note that the
tenure status of the two seller types may systematically differ. This is especially true if
the agent-owned sample includes real estate agents who own several rental properties or flip
houses.18 In Table 4 we address this concern by including two indicator variables that control
for tenure status. The tenure status variables identify whether the house was listed as vacant
or a rental. Rentals generally sell for a discount because they are of lower quality and have
18We filter out houses that sold more than two times within a three year period. However, we still suspect
that rehabbers and landlords with numerous rental properties are more likely to have a real estate license.
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more wear and tear relative to owner-occupied houses (Wang et al., 1991). Vacant properties
also sell for a discount that is generally attributed to (i) empty houses not showing as well or
(ii) motivated sellers who have less bargaining power (Turnbull and Zahirovic-Herbert, 2011).
Rutherford et al. (2005) include similar tenure status controls, but Levitt and Syverson
(2008) do not. In subsequent analysis we remove houses that are listed as vacant or rental
to allow for a cleaner, more direct comparison of agent-owned and non-agent-owned sales
transactions.
Baseline results are presented for Atlanta and Phoenix in Panels A and B of Table 4,
respectively. The first three columns include time by zip code fixed effects alongside the
aforementioned standard property attributes. The fixed effects in columns 1 to 3 are compa-
rable to the time by city fixed effects employed in Levitt and Syverson (2008). In addition to
including the tenure status controls, we also interact them with the agent-owned indicator
variable to isolate the agent-owned premium for occupied housing. Although Rutherford
et al. (2005) include the tenure status controls, they do not interact them with the agent-
owned variable. Consistent with the extant literature, our initial estimate for the agent-
owned premium is 3.3% in Atlanta and 4.0% in Phoenix. The estimates in column 1 control
for differences in the standard house characteristics, but do not include the textual informa-
tion available in the remarks section of the MLS. Thus, they likely suffer from an omitted
variable bias.
In the absence of the textual information, the agent-owned estimate in Column 1 is
both economically and statistically significant for Atlanta. After we include the textual
information from the remarks in columns 2 (Ŝzip2 ) and 3 (L&S), the agent-owned estimate
is no longer statistically significant.19 Also note that the Ŝzip2 token set reduces the vacant
(rental) estimate from -12.1% (-3.8%) in column 1 to -7.2% (-1.7%) in column 2. In contrast,
the L&S token set has a smaller impact on the vacant estimate and actually increases the
rental discount from -3.8% to -4.9%. This is probably due to the fact that the L&S token
19The L&S tokens represent the token set described in the appendix of Levitt and Syverson (2008).
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set includes mostly “positive” tokens.20 Similar results are reported in Panel B for Phoenix.
The agent-owned estimate drops from 4.0% to 1.7% when the textual information from the
remarks is included. In contrast to Atlanta, the agent-owned estimate remains statistically
significant for occupied housing.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 4 include time by census tract fixed effects alongside the
standard property attributes and tenure status controls. In the absence of information from
the remarks, we naively estimate an agent-owned premium in column 4 of 3.3% for Atlanta
and 3.5% for Phoenix. When the tokens in Ŝtract2 are included in column 5, the agent-owned
premium declines to 1.5% in Phoenix and is no longer statistically significant in Atlanta.
The final column of Table 4 includes the L&S token set alongside the controls in column
4. The agent-owned estimate for Atlanta is 2.1% and is statistically significant at the 10%
level. Once again, the agent-owned estimate for Phoenix using the L&S token set (2.7%) is
noticeably larger than the estimate using the Ŝtract2 token set (1.5%).
4.2.1 Alternative Token Sets
In Table 5 we filter out (i) transactions in which the house was listed as vacant, (ii) transac-
tions in which the house was listed as a rental, and (iii) agent-owned transactions in which
the listing agent had more than three agent-owned transactions during the entire study pe-
riod. The resulting subsample is homogeneous in terms of tenure status, thereby allowing us
to isolate and compare occupied agent-owned and non-agent-owned housing transactions.
Every column in Table 5 includes the standard property controls and time by zip code
fixed effects. Column 1 displays agent-owned estimates for the occupied housing subsample
in the absence of tokens. Consistent with previous research, we estimate an agent-owned
premium of 2.9% in Atlanta and 3.5% in Phoenix. Column 2 includes the 1,057 (1,167)
unigram tokens in Ŝzip2 for Atlanta (Phoenix). Given the large number of tokens we include
in column 2, it is reasonable to ask if there is any information in the tokens we did not select.
20We examine the extent to which the positive and negative tokens in the MLS remarks address the
omitted variable bias associated with agent-owned sales transactions in Section C.1 of the internet appendix.
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To answer this, we include 943 (833) of the 2,000 candidate tokens that are in the complement
of Ŝzip2 as regressors alongside the standard attributes in column 3 of Panel A (Panel B). In
doing so, we ask the question “do the tokens not selected by the variable selection procedure
contain important information?” The short answer is yes. The agent-owned estimate drops
from 2.9% to 2.4% for Atlanta and 3.5% to 2.9% for Phoenix. Although not reported in
Table 5 the explanatory power of the complement token set in column 3 is weaker than the
Ŝzip2 token set in column 2. For example, in Phoenix the complement token set increases R
2
from 91.2% to 91.7%. Whereas, the Ŝzip2 token set increases the R
2 to 93.7%.
A natural criticism is that by including many regressors we are overfitting the data in-
sample and reporting a misleading agent-owned estimate. We assuage this critique using a
permutation of the remarks. Specifically, we permute the remarks by randomly sampling
the remarks without replacement and treat these remarks as the true remarks. We then
create token indicators based on the Ŝzip2 token set that was created using the non-permuted
remarks. Results for this experiment are reported in column 4. The agent-owned premium
reported in column 4 is nearly identical to the estimate reported in column 1. Thus, it does
not appear as though the estimates in column 2 are the result of overfitting. Instead, they
are the product of the approach’s ability to accurately identify the set of tokens that indicate
the true condition and quality of the underlying property.
As noted earlier, the bulk of the analysis reported in this study uses the unigram token
set. For comparison purposes we report agent-owned estimates using bigrams in column 5
and flex-grams in column 6. The bigram token set differs from the unigram token set in
that it uses two-word phrases instead of single words. Similarly, the flex-gram token set
includes commonly used single and multi-word phrases. The flex-gram creation process is
described in Section B.2 of the internet appendix. Regardless of the token set employed the
agent-owned estimate is no longer statistically significant in Panel A and the magnitude of
the estimate decreases considerably in Panel B.21
21We also ran the analysis using only the tokens in Ŝp. The results are similar, but magnitude of the
agent-owned coefficient differs slightly.
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Market specific subperiod estimates are also provided in Table 5. The subperiod delin-
eations are selected using a home price index specific to each market. Additional information
on the subperiod selection process is provided in Section A.3 of the appendix. The subperiod
estimates follow the same pattern as those reported for the entire study period, although
they increase in magnitude during the boom, bust and recovery. The results suggest that
at least a portion of the agent-owned premium reported in previous studies is attributable
to agents purchasing properties that differ in terms of quality, condition, and/or features
relative to the average property in the market. This is in contrast to the incentive problems
discussed in Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008).
We recognize that the study periods in Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008) predate the rise of the internet when potential home buyers had to go to a brokerage
office to view the houses available for sale in a preprinted MLS book. During this time period,
real estate agents were the “gatekeepers” of the MLS listings, so they almost certainly had
an information advantage. The proliferation of real estate websites such as Redfin, Trulia
and Zillow has partially leveled the playing field and made more information available online.
However, these websites have not changed an agent’s incentive to sell their house for a higher
price or the fact that most home buyers are still at an informational disadvantage relative
to real estate agents. The subperiod estimates in this study lend support this conjecture as
the magnitude of the naive agent-owned estimates monotonically increase in both markets
from the beginning to the end of the study periods.
4.2.2 Restricted Samples
In this section we further restrict the occupied housing subsample using the joint constraints
employed in Rutherford et al. (2005). The first constraint, whose estimates are displayed in
column 2 (without tokens) and column 6 (with tokens) of Table 6, restricts the sample to
only properties listed in the same census block group as an agent-owned transaction. The
first constraint helps limit the variability in location and physical characteristics. The second
24
constraint, whose estimates are displayed in column 3 (without tokens) and column 7 (with
tokens), restricts the sample to only include properties listed by an agent that has at least
one agent-owned sales transaction during the study period. The second constraint creates
a sample in which agency issues should be more easily identified if they exist. Column
4 (without tokens) and column 8 (with tokens) apply both constraints simultaneously to
further assess the sensitivity of the agent-owned estimates.
Panel A displays the results for Atlanta for the entire study period and two market
subperiods. After imposing the restrictions on the sample, the agent-owned estimates are
no longer significant. The results validate our earlier findings that agent-owned houses did
not sell for a premium relative to non-agent-owned houses in Atlanta from 2007-2016. The
results highlight the fact that our approach effectively incorporated the textual information
from the public remarks section of the MLS to control for the variability in location, physical
characteristics, and potential agency issues. The results also highlight the need to include
the information provided in the textual description of an asset in pricing models when the
asset trades in a heterogeneous market.
Panel B displays the agent-owned estimates using the restricted samples for Phoenix.
Although the constraints reduce the magnitude of the agent-owned estimates, they remain
significant in every subperiod. However, once the constraints and the textual information
are included in columns 6 to 8, the agent-owned estimates are no longer significant during
the pre-boom and bust subperiods. Although the agent-owned estimates remain significant
during the boom and recovery subperiods, the magnitude of the premium drops considerably.
The results highlight the value of the informational content in the textual description of the
property and its ability to address a portion of the omitted variable bias that is present in
previous studies.
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4.2.3 Repeat Sales
A repeat sales methodology is often used to address omitted variable bias concerns in the
literature. The approach has been used to examine, among other things, information asym-
metry in real estate markets (Kurlat and Stroebel 2015; Stroebel 2016), school quality’s
effect on house prices (Figlio and Lucas 2004; Ries and Somerville 2010), the performance
of real estate auctions relative to negotiated sales (Mayer, 1998), and investments in alter-
native assets such as art (Goetzmann 1993; Korteweg et al. 2015). In this study we show
that the omitted variable bias is not resolved when a repeat sales methodology is employed.
Differencing Equation 1 gives us:
∆pnt = pnt − pns = ∆xmntβ + ∆dntτ + ∆ψnt + ∆vnt (9)
Similar to the hedonic model, an unbiased estimate of the agent-owned premium requires the
assumption that there is no correlation between the change in a property’s condition before
and after an agent-owned transaction, E[∆dnt∆ψnt] = 0.
22 Unlike the hedonic model, an un-
biased agent-owned premium in the repeat-sales estimator does not require any assumptions
about the correlation between agent-owned transactions and quality because the approach
assumes quality remains constant over time. In any event, if agent-owned properties have
superior maintenance (i.e. they are in excellent condition), then the agent-owned estimates
will still be biased.
The repeat sales specifications in Table 7 are comparable to the baseline specifications
in Table 4, except for the removal and replacement of the standard house attributes with
house fixed effects. The inclusion of house fixed effects requires a repeat sales sample in which
houses that sold once during the study period are dropped. The results in Table 7 are similar
to the previously reported results. The naive agent-owned estimate is significant and of a
greater magnitude than the agent-owned estimates that incorporate the textual information
22In addition, we also require E[∆xmnt∆ψnt] = 0 but this is not the focus of the paper.
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from the public remarks. The results suggest that using a repeat sales estimation approach
does not adequately address omitted variable bias concerns.
4.2.4 Time-on-market
Up to this point we have focused solely on sales price. In this section we estimate time-
on-market (TOM) for agent-owned houses. Rutherford et al. (2005) find that agent-owned
houses sell for a premium, but do not stay on the market for a longer period of time. Levitt
and Syverson (2008), in contrast, argue that real estate agents have an incentive to convince
their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. They find that agent-owned
houses stay on the market 9.5 days longer.
Table 8 displays TOM estimates for Atlanta in Panel A and Phoenix in Panel B. The
TOM estimates are for occupied housing only and represent the additional number of days
that the house was listed on the market.23 The estimates for Atlanta are insignificant across
the entire study period regardless of the functional form and tokens employed. The TOM
estimates are insignificant in Phoenix except for the bust subperiod. Similar to Rutherford
et al. (2005), we find that agent-owned houses are generally not on the market longer than
non-agent-owned houses.24
4.3 Robustness Check
As a robustness check and to demonstrate the generalizability of our approach, we also
examine vacant house price discounts. Rutherford et al. (2005) include an indicator variable
for vacant houses that identifies when “the owner has already moved and thus needs to sell.”
Although it is not the focus of their study, Rutherford et al. (2005) estimate that vacant
houses sell for a 6% to 7% discount. Studies whose primary focus is the estimation of vacancy
discounts, such as Turnbull and Zahirovic-Herbert (2011), report similar estimates.25
23Similar results are found when log(TOM) is the dependent variable.
24We also examine the co-determination of sales price and time-on-market in Section C.4 of the internet
appendix.
25Levitt and Syverson (2008) do not identify vacant houses in their list of standard attributes or keywords.
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Although we do not doubt the sign and significance of the results reported in previ-
ous studies, we suspect that the magnitude of the results may be overestimated due to an
omitted variable bias. Turnbull and Zahirovic-Herbert (2011) raise a similar concern noting
that “vacancy might also signal the presence of an unobservable factor that reduces buyer
willingness to pay for the house. The notion here is that vacant houses have undesirable
characteristics that are observed by sellers and buyers but are not reported in the data
(condition, architecture, etc.).” The undesirable characteristics not only reduce the buyer’s
willingness to pay, but also contribute to the property being vacant in the first place. Thus, if
the undesirable characteristics are not properly controlled for the magnitude of the vacancy
discount will be biased. We examine whether we can control for the “undesirable character-
istics” that Turnbull and Zahirovic-Herbert (2011) mention using the textual information in
the remarks section of the MLS. To do so, we rerun the double-selection LASSO procedure
with an indicator variable for vacant houses in lieu of the indicator variable for agent-owned
transactions in Equation 6.
Table 9 displays the results for Atlanta in columns 1 to 4 and Phoenix in columns 5
to 8. Agent-owned and rental property transactions are not included to allow for a more
direct comparison of vacant versus occupied price differentials. Every column includes the
standard property attributes and time by zip code (census tract) fixed effects are included
in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 (3, 4, 7 and 8). The vacant estimates are provided for the entire
study period and several subperiods.26 Odd columns in Table 9 display naive estimates and
even columns display estimates that incorporate the textual information from the remarks.
Similar to the agent-owned estimates we find that the magnitude of the vacant estimates
decrease when the textual information from the public remarks is incorporated. In Atlanta,
the vacant discount estimate drops 41% from 8.7% to 5.1% using zip code controls. The
results in Phoenix mimic Atlanta. The vacant discount estimate drops 48% from 4.8% to
26When estimating agent-owned premiums, Atlanta’s entire study period is 2007 to 2016 because the
agent-owned variable was not available in the data set prior to 2007. However, when estimating the vacant
discounts, Atlanta’s entire study period is 2000 to 2016 because the vacant variable is populated and available
for the entire study period.
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2.5%. The results in Table 9 highlight the effect the real estate market cycle has on vacancy
discounts. The magnitude of the vacancy discounts is much lower during the pre-boom and
boom subperiods relative to the bust and recovery subperiods. Regardless of the subperiod,
the inclusion of the textual information from the agent remarks reduces the vacant discount
estimate, thereby demonstrating our approach’s ability to address a portion of the data-
omitted variable bias inherent in the naive estimates.
5 Conclusion
Although researchers often have access to textual information about an asset, the high-
dimensional nature of text precludes the use of conventional econometric techniques. We
provide a data-driven framework for incorporating text into asset pricing models using a
double-selection LASSO procedure that removes the researcher’s qualitative judgment as
part of the analytical procedure. More specifically, we create a real estate specific dictio-
nary that (i) can be used to predict house prices and/or agent-owned transactions and (ii)
is sufficient for valid asymptotic inference on the true parameter of interest (e.g. agent-
owned transactions). The framework we describe is incredibly flexible and can be used to
incorporate textual information into asset pricing models beyond real estate.27
Empirically, we show that the textual information in the remarks section of a MLS
listing can be used to mitigate the data-omitted variable bias associated with agent-owned
transactions. Using MLS data from Atlanta, Georgia and Phoenix, Arizona we replicate the
naive agent-owned premium estimates in Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008) of 3 to 4 percent. However, after we incorporate the textual information from the
remarks section of the MLS, the agent-owned premium drops by over 50 percent in Phoenix
and is no longer statistically significant in Atlanta. Using a restricted subsample we also find
that the agent-owned estimate is statistically insignificant in Phoenix during the pre-boom
27For example, the framework we develop is applicable to any asset class in which an Akerlof (1970) lemons
type market can arise such as used cars or unbranded hotels.
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(2000-2003) and bust (2007-2009) subperiods.
Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) interpret the naive agent-owned
estimates as agents having an information advantage that they can exploit when selling their
own house. We show that the naive estimates suffer from a model-omitted variable bias that
can be mitigated by including textual information from the remarks section of the MLS.
After we include the textual information, we find that real estate agents do not necessarily
sell their own house for more than comparable client-owned houses. Thus, we conclude that
real estate agents do not use their information advantage to their clients’ detriment (i.e. an
agency problem does not exist).
We also show that using a repeat sales estimator approach does not resolve the model-
omitted variable bias. This is because the repeat-sales approach assumes that the condition
and quality of the house and neighborhood remain constant over time. We show that the in-
clusion of the textual information in the repeat sales model helps control for the time-varying
condition of the house and neighborhood, thereby allowing us to isolate the pricing differ-
ential for agent-owned properties. The results highlight the importance of including textual
information in asset pricing models, especially when the assets trade in a heterogeneous
market.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sample of MLS Listings
Sample Listing 1
Tract Beds Baths Sqft Date Price uˆ uˆ2
04013217900 3 2 1,491 3/28/2013 $167,000 0.134 0.054
MLS Remarks: flagstone in kitchen, dining and den. new kitchen cabinets with island.
wood floors in family room, hallway and master suite. fully-remodeled baths, new tile
and plumbing fixtures. all new copper plumbing throughout. a/c and master cool evap.
great pool with redwood deck. block fence. el dorado park just down the street!
Sample Listing 2
Tract Beds Baths Sqft Date Price uˆ uˆ2
04013217900 3 2 1,497 3/14/2013 $139,900 −0.146 −0.004
MLS Remarks: great opportunity for investment or affordable housing-3 bedroom, 2
bath + bonus room (ideal office/playroom)-this solidly built brick hallcraft home-needs
cosmetic work but has good roof, a/c, large yard, rv gate & great potential washer, dryer,
refrigerator & dishwasher are included in ’as is’ condition
Note: Table 1 displays two transactions in the data with the original remarks in the MLS
listing. Both listings are 3 bedroom, 2 bathroom houses with approximately 1,500 square
feet of living area that sold within two weeks of each other and are located in the same census
tract. uˆ is the baseline residual from a hedonic model using census tract by time fixed effects
and property controls. uˆ2 is the residual when the textual information from the remarks,
Sˆ2, is included as indicator variables in the hedonic model. The flex-grams (i.e. words and
phrases) in Sˆ2 are indicated with bold text.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Atlanta (2007-2016)
Min Pctl(25) Mean Median Pctl(75) Max
Price (000s) 50.00 136.10 225.31 192.74 283.00 2,600.00
Sfla (000s) 0.57 1.64 2.20 2.12 2.67 6.00
Age 2.00 14.00 29.81 24.00 42.00 196.00
Bedrooms 1.00 3.00 3.63 4.00 4.00 6.00
Bathrooms 1.00 2.00 2.49 2.50 3.00 3.50
Agent-owned 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rental 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00
Vacant 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Phoenix (2000-2013)
Min Pctl(25) Mean Median Pctl(75) Max
Price (000s) 50.00 142.50 247.48 204.00 293.00 3,000.00
Sfla (000s) 0.50 1.44 1.92 1.77 2.24 6.00
Age 2.00 7.00 19.86 16.00 29.00 122.00
Bedrooms 1.00 3.00 3.28 3.00 4.00 6.00
Bathrooms 1.00 2.00 2.16 2.00 2.50 3.50
Agent-owned 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rental 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00
Vacant 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Panel A includes transactions in Atlanta, GA from 2007 to 2016. Panel B includes transactions in
Phoenix, AZ from 2000 to 2013. The descriptive statistics are based on the authors’ calculations.
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Table 3: Similarity of Tokens Selected
Panel A: Atlanta (2007-2016)
tract, Price tract, Agent-owned zip, Price zip, Agent-owned tract, Both zip, Both
tract, Price 1
tract, Owner Agent -0.027 1
zip, Price 0.797 -0.023 1
zip, Owner Agent -0.030 0.990 -0.028 1
tract, Both 0.788 0.459 0.621 0.456 1
zip, Both 0.618 0.462 0.786 0.462 0.834 1
Non-Zero 827 386 818 386 1,064 1,057
Panel B: Phoenix (2000-2013)
tract, Price tract, Agent-owned zip, Price zip, Agent-owned tract, Both zip, Both
tract, Price 1
tract, Owner Agent 0.079 1
zip, Price 0.782 0.088 1
zip, Owner Agent 0.074 0.983 0.078 1
tract, Both 0.789 0.492 0.619 0.481 1
zip, Both 0.612 0.484 0.789 0.49 0.818 1
Non-Zero 927 502 932 503 1,162 1,167
Note: Table 3 examines the tokens selected using the double-selection variable selection method. We create
indicator variables for each of the 2,000 candidate tokens where each indicator variable is equal to 1 if the
token is non-zero in the variable selection procedure. Using these 2,000 indicator variables, we create a
2, 000 × 1 vector of the indicator variables. The top part of each panel presents the correlation between
these vectors. The last row of each panel lists the total number of non-zero variables for each vector. [tract,
Price] and [zip, Price] ([tract, Agent-owned] and [zip, Agent-owned]) are the vector of indicator variables
when Price (Agent-owned indicator) is the dependent variable in the variable selection procedure. [tract,
Both] ([zip, Both]) is the element-wise maximum of [tract, Price] and [tract, Agent-owned] ([zip, Price] and
[zip, Agent-owned]) and correspond to those variables in Ŝtract2 (Ŝ
zip
2 ). Panel A includes the token sets
for transactions in Atlanta, GA from 2007 to 2016 and Panel B includes the token sets for transactions in
Phoenix, AZ from 2000 to 2013.
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Table 4: Baseline agent-owned estimates by tenure
Panel A: Atlanta (2007-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agent-owned 0.033∗∗ 0.012 0.021 0.033∗∗ 0.015 0.021∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Vacant −0.121∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011)
Vacant x Agent-owned 0.055∗ 0.015 0.013 0.063∗∗ 0.021 0.023
(0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.025) (0.014) (0.021)
Rental −0.038∗ −0.017 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.005 −0.026∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012)
Rental x Agent-owned 0.020 −0.002 0.014 0.030 0.006 0.024
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
N 106,048 106,048 106,048 106,048 106,048 106,048
K 1,110 2,167 1,161 5,642 6,706 5,693
R2 0.809 0.862 0.827 0.862 0.898 0.876
Panel B: Phoenix (2000-2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agent-owned 0.040∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Vacant −0.048∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Vacant x Agent-owned −0.025∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Rental −0.069∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
Rental x Agent-owned −0.026∗∗ −0.004 −0.020∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.006 −0.018∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
N 275,049 275,049 275,049 275,049 275,049 275,049
K 1,838 3,005 1,890 11,571 12,733 11,623
R2 0.901 0.929 0.908 0.929 0.947 0.934
Controls X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 L&S Sˆ
tract
2 L&S
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Agent-owned estimates are reported for Atlanta in Panel A and Phoenix in Panel B. Every column
incorporates a set of controls that include the age of the house and indicator variables for bedrooms, bath-
rooms, living area, and lot size. Columns 1 to 3 include multiplicatively separable time and zip code fixed
effects. Columns 4 to 6 include multiplicatively separable time and census tract fixed effects. Columns 1
and 4 do not include any tokens. Columns 2 and 5 include unigram tokens in the set Sˆ2 that differ only in
the use of zip or tract fixed effects during the variable selection process. Columns 3 and 6 use the token set
described in Levitt and Syverson (2008).
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Table 5: Agent-owned estimates using alternative tokens by subperiod
Panel A: Atlanta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire 0.029∗∗ 0.014 0.024∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.017 0.017
Bust 0.021∗∗ 0.009 0.017 0.022∗∗ 0.011 0.014
Recovery 0.034∗∗∗ 0.016 0.027 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021 0.019
Panel B: Phoenix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire 0.035∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
Pre-boom 0.024∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
Boom 0.037∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
Bust 0.044∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗
Recovery 0.049∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
Controls X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 Sˆ
zipc
2 Sˆ
zipp
2 Sˆ
zipbi
2 Sˆ
zipf
2
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Transactions in which the house was flagged as either vacant or a rental are not included, so the
estimates reported are for occupied housing only. Agent-owned transactions by listing agents with more
than three agent-owned transactions over the entire study period are also removed. Estimates for Atlanta
are displayed in Panel A and Phoenix in Panel B. Every column incorporates a set of controls that include the
age of the house and indicator variables for bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, and lot size. Multiplicatively
separable time and zip code fixed effects are employed in every column. Column 1 does not include any
tokens and column 2 includes the unigram token set Sˆzip2 . Column 3 uses the set of 2,000 most frequent
unigram tokens not in Sˆzip2 . Column 4 uses the Sˆ
zip
2 unigram token set, but permutes the remarks. Column
5 uses the bigram token set and column 6 uses the flex-gram token set. Agent-owned estimates are provided
for the entire study period and several market specific subperiods.
38
Table 6: Agent-owned estimates using restricted subsamples
Panel A: Atlanta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Entire 0.029∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.018 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.015 0.012
Bust 0.021∗∗ 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.001 −0.002 −0.006
Recovery 0.034∗∗∗ 0.024 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.010 0.019 0.017
Panel B: Phoenix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Entire 0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
Pre-boom 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.006 0.009∗∗ 0.005
Boom 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
Bust 0.044∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016
Recovery 0.049∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
Controls X X X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X X X X X X
BG Restrict X X X X
AO Restrict X X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip
2
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Transactions in which the house was listed as either vacant or a rental are not included, so the estimates
reported are for occupied housing only. Agent-owned transactions by listing agents with more than three
agent-owned transactions over the entire study period are also removed. Market specific subperiod estimates
are reported for Atlanta in Panel A and Phoenix in Panel B. Every column incorporates a set of controls
that include the age of the house and indicator variables for bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, lot size,
and multiplicatively separable time and zip code fixed effects. Columns 1 to 4 do not include any tokens.
Columns 5 to 8 include the unigram token set Sˆzip2 . Columns 1 and 5 include the entire occupied housing
transaction sample (i.e. vacant and rental properties are not included). Columns 2 and 6 restrict the
occupied housing sample to only include transactions located in a census block group that had at least one
agent-owned transaction during the study period. Columns 3 and 7 restrict the occupied housing sample to
only include transactions by listing agents that had at least one agent-owned sales transaction during the
study period. Columns 4 and 8 restrict the occupied housing sample to include transactions that were both
(i) by a listing agent with at least one agent-owned transacation and (ii) located in a census block group
that had at least one agent-owned transaction.
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Table 7: Repeat sales agent-owned estimates
Panel A: Atlanta (2007-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agent-owned 0.063∗∗∗ 0.017 0.034 0.063∗∗ 0.038 0.044
(0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.031) (0.042) (0.033)
N 13,404 13,404 13,404 13,404 13,404 13,404
K 7,496 8,551 7,547 9,761 10,822 9,812
R2 0.969 0.981 0.973 0.984 0.991 0.986
Panel B: Phoenix (2000-2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agent-owned 0.029∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
N 58,810 58,810 58,810 58,810 58,810 58,810
K 30,343 31,510 30,395 36,917 38,079 36,969
R2 0.982 0.986 0.983 0.988 0.991 0.989
House FE X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 L&S Sˆ
tract
2 L&S
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: The repeat sales estimates only include houses that sold at least twice during the study period.
Transactions in which the house was flagged as either vacant or a rental are not included. Agent-owned
transactions by listing agents with more than three agent-owned transactions over the entire study period
are also removed. Panel A includes transactions in Atlanta, GA from 2007 to 2016 and Panel B includes
transactions in Phoenix, AZ from 2000 to 2013. Every column includes house fixed effects. Multiplicatively
separable time and zip code fixed effects are employed in columns 1 to 3 and multiplicatively separable time
and census tract fixed effects are employed in columns 4 to 6. Columns 1 and 4 do not include any tokens.
Columns 2 and 5 include unigram tokens in the set Sˆ2 that differ only in the use of zip or tract fixed effects
during the variable selection process. Columns 3 and 6 use the token set described in Levitt and Syverson
(2008).
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Table 8: Agent-owned time-on-market estimates
Panel A: Atlanta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire 1.95 0.10 2.04 2.82 0.89 2.90
Bust 7.04 6.40 6.91 8.94 7.14 8.79
Recovery −1.12 −2.98 −0.93 −0.77 −2.80 −0.59
Panel B: Phoenix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire 2.14 1.53 1.97 2.04 1.46 1.84
Pre-boom 0.79 −0.00 0.71 0.43 −0.33 0.32
Boom −1.32 −2.20 −1.48 −1.37 −2.22 −1.55
Bust 9.89∗ 11.22∗ 9.77∗ 10.60 11.01∗ 10.47∗
Recovery 5.26 4.47 4.67 5.55 4.87 4.97
Controls X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 L&S Sˆ
zip
2 L&S
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Time-on-market (TOM) estimates for Atlanta and Phoenix are displayed in Panel A and B, respec-
tively. Transactions in which the house was flagged as either vacant or a rental are not included, so the
estimates reported are for occupied housing only. Agent-owned transactions by listing agents with more
than three agent-owned transactions over the entire study period are also removed. Every column incorpo-
rates a set of controls that include the age of the house and indicator variables for bedrooms, bathrooms,
living area, and lot size. Columns 1 to 3 include multiplicatively separable time and zip code fixed effects
and columns 4 to 6 include multiplicatively separable time and census tract code fixed effects. Columns 1
and 4 do not use any tokens. Columns 2 and 5 use the unigram token set Sˆzip2 . Column 3 and 6 use the
token set described in Levitt and Syverson (2008). The agent-owned TOM estimates are provided for the
entire study period and the subperiods described in Section A.3.
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Table 9: Vacant discount estimates
Atlanta Phoenix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Entire −0.087∗∗∗−0.051∗∗∗−0.075∗∗∗−0.046∗∗∗−0.048∗∗∗−0.025∗∗∗−0.042∗∗∗−0.023∗∗∗
Pre-boom −0.033∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗−0.032∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗−0.032∗∗∗−0.015∗∗∗−0.032∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗
Boom −0.055∗∗∗−0.029∗∗∗−0.049∗∗∗−0.028∗∗∗−0.032∗∗∗−0.015∗∗∗−0.029∗∗∗−0.015∗∗∗
Bust −0.156∗∗∗−0.082∗∗∗−0.134∗∗∗−0.074∗∗∗−0.073∗∗∗−0.038∗∗∗−0.063∗∗∗−0.034∗∗∗
Recovery −0.107∗∗∗−0.069∗∗∗−0.090∗∗∗−0.059∗∗∗−0.074∗∗∗−0.039∗∗∗−0.059∗∗∗−0.033∗∗∗
Controls X X X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 Sˆ
tract
2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
tract
2
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Vacant discount estimates are displayed for Atlanta, GA in columns 1 to 4 and Phoenix, AZ in
columns 5 to 8. Transactions in which the house was flagged as agent-owned or a rental are not included.
Every column incorporates a set of controls that include the age of the house and indicator variables for
bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, and lot size. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 include multiplicatively separable
time and zip code fixed effects. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 include multiplicatively separable time and census
tract fixed effects. Odd columns do not include tokens. Even columns include unigram tokens in the set Sˆ2
that differ only in the use of zip code or census tract fixed effects during the variable selection process. The
first row displays vacant coefficient estimates for the entire study period in Atlanta (2000-2016) and Phoenix
(2000-2013). The pre-boom (2000-2003) and boom (2004-2006) periods are aligned for Atlanta and Phoenix.
However, Atlanta’s bust (2007-2011) and recovery (2012-2016) subperiods differ from the bust (2006-2009)
and recovery (2010-2013) subperiods in Phoenix. Additional information about the subperiods is provided
in the appendix in Section A.3.
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Figure 1: Implicit Prices for Unigram Tokens
Atlanta Zip Code Atlanta Census Tract
Phoenix Zip Code Phoenix Census Tract
Note: The top ten positive and negative unigram tokens are displayed for Atlanta and Phoenix. The tokens
with the largest magnitudes were selected from the zip code and census tract token sets.
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Figure 2: θˆp and θˆd for Bigram Tokens
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Note: Figure 2 plots θˆp and θˆd from the `1 penalized hedonic and linear probability models in Equations 5
and 6. θˆp represents the coefficients for the tokens in Sˆp when transaction price is the dependent variable in
Equation 5 and θˆd represents the coefficients for the tokens in Sˆd when the agent-owned indicator variable
is the dependent variable in Equation 6. Tokens that are in both Sˆp and Sˆd are displayed as red circles.
Tokens in Sˆp (Sˆd) but not Sˆd (Sˆp) are displayed as unfilled squares. For clarity, only the 20 largest θˆp in
absolute value and the 20 largest θˆd in absolute value are displayed.
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A Data Overview
A.1 Data filters
We drop houses that sold twice within a three year period, had a public remark with a length less than ten
characters, or were involved in a distressed sales transaction. To eliminate outliers, we also drop transactions
that do not meet the following criteria:
1. $50,000 ≤ sale price ≤ $3,000,000
2. 500 ≤ square feet of living area ≤ 6,000
3. 1 ≤ bedrooms ≤ 6
4. 1 ≤ bathrooms ≤ 3.5
5. age ≥ 2
6. acres ≤ 5
7. time-on-market > 0
46
A.2 Standard housing attributes
Table A1: Atlanta agent-owned controls
Mean Basic Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
Age (Years) 29.806 -0.001 -0.001
Rental 0.031 -0.046 -0.019
Vacant 0.353 -0.125 -0.074
Acres: .5 - 1 0.108 0.024 0.027
Acres: 1 - 2 0.031 0.103 0.091
Acres: 2 - 5 0.010 0.227 0.222
Baths: 1.5 0.021 0.067 0.048
Baths: 2 0.286 0.245 0.189
Baths: 2.5 0.361 0.302 0.237
Baths: 3 0.167 0.327 0.265
Baths: 3.5 0.127 0.450 0.356
Beds: 2 0.034 -0.050 -0.040
Beds: 3 0.424 -0.058 -0.017
Beds: 4 0.428 -0.018 0.026
Beds: 5 0.105 -0.001 0.047
Beds: 6 0.008 -0.057 0.018
Sfla: 500 - 1000 0.015 -0.079 -0.069
Sfla: 1500 - 2000 0.263 0.134 0.112
Sfla: 2000 - 2500 0.242 0.272 0.225
Sfla: 2500 - 3000 0.177 0.409 0.335
Sfla: 3000 - 3500 0.088 0.510 0.418
Sfla: 3500 - 4000 0.035 0.598 0.494
Sfla: 4000 - 4500 0.013 0.655 0.550
Sfla: 4500 - 5000 0.004 0.733 0.607
Sfla: 5000 - 5500 0.002 0.815 0.703
Sfla: 5500 - 6000 0.000 0.898 0.797
Note: Table A1 displays descriptive statistics and implicit prices for the control variables based on transac-
tions in Atlanta, GA from 2007 to 2016. The age of the house is the only continuous variable. The remaining
variables are dummies for the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, lot size, vacant, and rental. All
implicit prices are relative to a 1 bed, 1 bath owner-occupied property with less than or equal to half an
acre of land and 1,000 to 1,500 square feet of living area. Here we use 500 square feet living area (sfla) bins
to save space when approximating the sfla coefficients. The empirical analysis uses 100 sfla bins. Column 2
presents the coefficient estimates without tokens and column 3 presents coefficient estimates when the tokens
are included in the regression.
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Table A2: Phoenix agent-owned controls
Mean Basic Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
Age (Years) 9.934 -0.006 -0.005
Rental 0.027 -0.097 -0.040
Vacant 0.374 -0.060 -0.032
Acres: .5 - 1 0.020 0.243 0.194
Acres: 1 - 2 0.024 0.254 0.196
Acres: 2 - 5 0.005 0.440 0.359
Baths: 1.5 0.143 0.078 0.073
Baths: 2 0.531 0.102 0.090
Baths: 2.5 0.140 0.086 0.098
Baths: 3 0.114 0.113 0.116
Baths: 3.5 0.032 0.184 0.158
Beds: 2 0.131 0.144 0.145
Beds: 3 0.514 0.140 0.166
Beds: 4 0.300 0.115 0.162
Beds: 5 0.052 0.038 0.129
Beds: 6 0.003 -0.036 0.087
Sfla: 500 - 1000 0.023 -0.140 -0.116
Sfla: 1500 - 2000 0.346 0.189 0.150
Sfla: 2000 - 2500 0.198 0.423 0.334
Sfla: 2500 - 3000 0.090 0.657 0.516
Sfla: 3000 - 3500 0.049 0.813 0.647
Sfla: 3500 - 4000 0.020 0.941 0.758
Sfla: 4000 - 4500 0.009 1.036 0.841
Sfla: 4500 - 5000 0.002 1.116 0.922
Sfla: 5000 - 5500 0.001 1.221 1.008
Sfla: 5500 - 6000 0.000 1.280 1.063
Note: Table A2 displays descriptive statistics and implicit prices for the control variables based on transac-
tions in Phoenix, AZ from 2000 to 2013. The age of the house is the only continuous variable. The remaining
variables are dummies for the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, lot size, vacant, and rental. All
implicit prices are relative to a 1 bed, 1 bath owner-occupied property with less than or equal to half an
acre of land and 1,000 to 1,500 square feet of living area. Here we use 500 square feet living area (sfla) bins
to save space when approximating the sfla coefficients. The empirical analysis uses 100 sfla bins. Column 2
presents the coefficient estimates without tokens and column 3 presents coefficient estimates when the tokens
are included in the regression.
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A.3 Subperiod Analysis
We use the Case-Shiller Repeat Sales Indices for Atlanta and Phoenix to identify the appropriate cutoffs
for the subperiod analysis. The subperiods in Atlanta represent bust (2007-2011) and recovery (2012-2016)
periods. The subperiods in Phoenix represent pre-boom (2000-2003), boom (2004-2006), bust (2007-2009),
and recovery (2010-2013) periods. The repeat-sales indices displayed in Figure A1 and Figure A2 were
downloaded from the St. Louis Federal reserve website.
Figure A1: Atlanta Case-Shiller Repeat Sales Index
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Figure A2: Phoenix Case-Shiller Repeat Sales Index
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B Tokenization Process (Internet Appendix)
B.1 Cleaning
Remarks are cleaned in the following order
1. Convert to lower case.
2. Replace commas (,) periods (.), ampersands (&) and the word and with ” STOP ”. A space is
placed at the beginning and end of STOP .
3. Replace all special characters with a space.
4. Replace apostrophes.
5. Remove all remaining single letters.
6. Replace all numbers with a space. Numbers can be in either numeric or character form.
7. Remove repeated STOPs and trim white space at the beginning and end.
8. Depluralize.
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B.2 Flex-gram tokens
We use the term flex-gram when referring to a phrase of n words. We use the term token when referring
to a flex-gram of arbitrary length. It is common in textual analysis to use 1-grams (unigrams), 2-grams,
(bigrams), or 3-grams (trigrams). Instead of using only unigrams, bigrams, or trigrams we use the following
iterative procedure that 1) identifies relevant flex-grams for arbitrary n and 2) removes k-grams (k < n) that
are constituent parts of larger flex-grams. After n iterations, each remark will include 1-grams, 2-grams,...,
(n− 1)-grams, and n-grams. Alternatively, each remark includes tokens for flex-grams for various n.
Notation: Each remark R1(i) for i = 1, ..., I is represented as a set of j = 1, ..., J(i) ordered elements, words,
1-grams, or unigrams, R1j . Dropping the dependence on i, R
1 = {R11, R12, ..., R1J}.
This procedure is performed using the function dasher in R and is available from the authors upon request.
This procedure can be performed with or without removing stop words from the cleansed remarks. Stop
words are unsubstantial words in the text and include many conjunctions, prepositions, and pronouns.
Examples include me, myself, i, as, am are, a, an, the, to, and too. We remove stop words using the English
stop words dictionary in the tm library in R.
1. Set n = 2
2. Paste together consecutive Rn−1j in Rn−1 creating a new set Q
n where Qn = {Rn−11 Rn−12 , Rn−12 Rn−13 ,
..., Rn−1J−1R
n−1
J } = {Qn1 , Qn2 , ..., QnJ−1}.
3. Remove any Qnj ∈ Qn that include STOP in either the first or second position.
4. Count the frequency of the Qnj across the Q
n(i), i = 1, ..., I.
5. Collect the Qnj that occur more than 100 < C times. Define this set as X
n with elements xns , s =
1, ..., S.
6. Sort the xns from most to least frequent. Beginning with the most frequent, x
n
1 , replace the R
n−1
j in
Rn−1 with xns wherever R
n−1
j−1R
n−1
j = x
n
s . Drop Q
n−1
j .
7. Set Rn = Rn−1.
8. Repeat steps 2-7 for n = 3, 4, ... iterations but only include n-grams in the calculations in Step 4.
Stop iterating when there are no n-grams that occur more than C times.
9. Remove all instances of STOP in Rn and return Rn.
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B.3 Flex-gram example
Original: Exquisite home on one acre lot. Professionally decorated with many upgraded features, split
floor plan, four bedrooms, spacious master suite with private exit to Pool and Courtyard. Wood shutters
through out the house. Formal Living and Dining room. Gourmet Kitchen with exit to paradise backyard
with endless entertaining possibilities, salt water pool and spa, built-in gas BBQ and firepit. Just sheer
enjoyment with sparkling pool with raised seating area. Full cover patio. Three car garage with lots of
built-in storage and generous RV parking on side of the house. True pride of ownership, this home has been
impeccably maintained.
Cleaned: exquisite home on acre lot STOP professionally decorated with many upgraded feature STOP
split floor plan STOP bedroom STOP spacious master suite with private exit to pool STOP courtyard STOP
wood shutter through out the house STOP formal living STOP dining room STOP gourmet kitchen with exit
to paradise backyard with endless entertaining possibilities STOP salt water pool STOP spa STOP built in
gas bbq STOP firepit STOP just sheer enjoyment with sparkling pool with raised seating area STOP full cover
patio STOP car garage with lot of built in storage STOP generous rv parking on side of the house STOP
true pride of ownership STOP this home has been impeccably maintained
Tokenized: exquisite home acre-lot professionally-decorated many upgraded-feature split-floor-plan bedroom
spacious-master-suite private-exit pool courtyard wood-shutter house formal-living dining-room gourmet-kitchen
exit paradise backyard endless entertaining possibilities salt-water-pool spa built gas-bbq firepit just sheer en-
joyment sparkling-pool raised seating-area full cover-patio car-garage lot built storage generous rv-parking
side house true-pride ownership home impeccably maintained
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B.4 Redundant tokens
A comparison of information provided by the standard attributes and remarks section of the MLS reveals
that some of the textual information in the remarks is redundant. For example, the GAMLS and ARMLS
data sets both provide an indicator variable that identifies agent-owned properties. Some of the transactions
that are flagged as agent-owned also have a token in the remarks that identifies them as agent owned, owner
agent, broker owned, licensed agent, or seller agent.28 If the standard agent-owned indicator variable is
correctly flagged in the MLS then the textual information in the remarks is redundant. However, if the real
estate agent mistakeningly overlooks the standard agent-owned field and only includes the information in
the remarks, it is not redundant.
Given that the empirical analysis focuses on agent-owned transactions we identify “agent-owned” tokens
in the remarks and use them to populate/validate the standard agent-owned field. After updating the
agent-owned field we remove the “agent-owned” tokens because they are redundant. There are a total of
2,003 agent-owned transactions in the Atlanta data. Of which, 64 (3.2%) are flagged in both sections, 1,890
(94.4%) are flagged only by the standard attribute field, and 49 (2.4%) are flagged only in the remarks.
There are 16,654 agent-owned transactions in the Phoenix data. Of which, 2,092 (12.6%) are flagged in both
sections, 13,491 (81.0%) are flagged only by the standard attribute field, and 1,071 (6.4%) are flagged only
in the remarks.
When running the vacant discount analysis in Table 9 we remove tokens that include the word vacant.
The removal of redundant tokens has to be carefully orchestrated as some tokens have unexpected dual
meanings. For example, the authors considered removing tokens that include the word empty when esti-
mating the vacant discounts. However, doing so would unintentionally flag houses that were marketed to
empty-nesters as vacant.
28This is an abridged list of the agent-owned tokens we identify. A complete list is available by request.
We suspect that the list of agent-owned keywords will vary by geography and across data sets. For that
reason we recommend a careful examination of the tokens and a custom built market specific agent-owned
token list.
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B.5 Double-selection token tables
The double-selection procedure that we employ selects tokens that can be used to (i) predict house prices
and/or (ii) identify agent-owned transactions in the data. The following tables display the top twenty tokens
based on the magnitude of the absolute value of the token’s coefficient. There are two tables for both Atlanta
and Phoenix. The tokens selected by the hedonic equation in Tables B1 and B3 can be used to predict house
prices in Atlanta and Phoenix, respectively. Whereas, the tokens selected by the linear probability equation
in Tables B2 and B4 can be used to identify agent-owned transactions in Atlanta and Phoenix, respectively.
Table B1: Selected Tokens from the Hedonic Equation (Atlanta)
Unigrams Bigrams n-grams
Token θˆ Token θˆ Token θˆ
townhome -0.21 investor-special -0.21 investment-opportunity -0.19
dock 0.18 sold-asis -0.20 dock 0.19
investor -0.14 fixer-upper -0.19 need-tlc -0.17
investment -0.14 tenant-occupied -0.19 investor -0.16
fixer -0.12 need-tlc -0.18 investment-property -0.16
gated 0.11 sld-asis -0.18 sold-asis -0.15
asis -0.09 need-work -0.17 sold-asis-condition -0.15
craftsman 0.09 investment-opportunity -0.15 investment -0.13
potential -0.09 lot-potential -0.15 cash -0.13
tlc -0.09 investment-property -0.14 gated 0.12
coffered 0.09 split-foyer -0.12 tlc -0.12
cash -0.09 great-investment -0.12 fixer-upper -0.12
restored 0.09 avondale-estate 0.12 craftsman-bungalow 0.11
charleston 0.09 split-level -0.11 split-level -0.10
eav 0.09 great-opportunity -0.11 asis -0.10
earthcraft 0.09 pre-qual -0.11 potential -0.10
tenant -0.08 coffered-ceiling 0.11 split-level-home -0.10
finishes 0.08 lock-box -0.11 repair -0.10
repair -0.08 market-village 0.11 coffered-ceiling 0.10
ashford 0.08 submit-offer -0.11 best-street 0.10
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Table B2: Selected Tokens from the Linear Probability Equation (Atlanta)
Unigrams Bigrams n-grams
Token θˆ Token θˆ Token θˆ
realize 0.36 just-renovated 0.24 new-fixture 0.16
highlight 0.12 renovated-brand 0.20 complete-renovation 0.13
taking 0.11 house-just 0.19 entire 0.12
business 0.09 elegant-home 0.12 new-granite-countertops 0.11
friend 0.07 room-area 0.10 highlight 0.09
gathering 0.06 new-fixture 0.08 home-spacious 0.08
entire 0.04 complete-renovation 0.08 new-stainless-steel-appliance 0.07
advantage 0.04 bathroom-home 0.07 friend 0.07
fixture 0.03 entire-house 0.07 large-closet 0.07
brand 0.03 renovated-new 0.06 home-great-neighborhood 0.07
travertine 0.03 home-just 0.06 gathering 0.07
wonderfully 0.03 new-appliance 0.03 new-granite-counter 0.06
renovated 0.02 home-spacious 0.03 new-appliance 0.04
just 0.02 just-waiting -0.03 bedroom-bathroom 0.04
renovation 0.02 brand-new 0.02 personal 0.04
dream 0.02 new-granite 0.02 new-home 0.03
around 0.02 recently-renovated 0.02 around 0.03
personal 0.02 new-flooring 0.02 wonderfully 0.03
create -0.02 new-home 0.02 renovated 0.02
pottery -0.02 spacious-living 0.02 new-paint 0.02
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Table B3: Selected Tokens from the Hedonic Equation (Phoenix)
Unigrams Bigrams n-grams
Token θˆ Token θˆ Token θˆ
dock 0.13 th-fairway 0.13 th-fairway 0.12
waterfront 0.11 lake-view 0.13 fairway 0.08
fairway 0.10 sold-asis -0.08 barn 0.08
cash -0.09 sub-zero 0.08 fix -0.07
historic 0.07 golf-course 0.07 golf-course-lot 0.07
barn 0.07 city-light 0.07 golf-course-view 0.07
membership 0.06 huge-loft -0.07 golf-course 0.06
hillside 0.06 spectacular-view 0.07 finishes 0.06
viking 0.06 panoramic-view 0.07 historic 0.06
disturb -0.06 travertine-floor 0.06 sold-asis -0.06
granite 0.05 large-loft -0.06 large-loft -0.06
course 0.05 outdoor-living 0.06 biltmore 0.06
loft -0.05 guard-gated 0.06 granite-counter 0.05
preserve 0.05 custom-cabinetry 0.06 loft -0.05
irrigated 0.05 large-home -0.06 guest-house 0.05
fix -0.05 granite-counter 0.05 city-light 0.05
finishes 0.05 guest-house 0.05 travertine-floor 0.05
biltmore 0.05 pebbletec-pool 0.05 course 0.05
tee 0.05 mountain-preserve 0.05 irrigated 0.05
vintage 0.05 course-community -0.05 salt-water-pool 0.05
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Table B4: Phoenix - Tokens Selected by Linear Probability Model
Unigrams Bigrams Flex-grams
Token θˆ Token θˆ Token θˆ
rubbed 0.07 new-tone 0.09 new-stainless-steel-appliance 0.09
tone 0.05 tone-paint 0.07 arizona 0.07
remodel 0.04 new-ceramic 0.07 new-ceiling-fan 0.06
epoxy 0.03 new-upgraded 0.07 remodel 0.05
hardware 0.03 new-stainless 0.06 tone-paint 0.05
lease 0.03 new-lighting 0.06 new-carpet 0.04
state 0.03 new-ceiling 0.05 new-paint 0.04
carry 0.03 new-berber 0.05 hardware 0.04
new 0.02 complete-remodel 0.05 new-paint-inside 0.04
paint 0.02 new-carpet 0.04 epoxy 0.04
granite 0.02 new-paint 0.04 new-interior 0.04
remodeled 0.02 new-kitchen 0.04 brand-new 0.03
stainless 0.02 new-custom 0.04 faucet 0.03
fixture 0.02 new-countertops 0.04 new-kitchen 0.03
travertine 0.02 can-close 0.04 inch 0.03
pride -0.02 stainless-appliance 0.03 fresh-paint-inside 0.03
completely 0.02 granite-slab 0.03 tone 0.03
faucet 0.02 new-granite 0.03 new-door 0.03
tenant 0.02 garage-floor 0.03 plumbing-fixture 0.03
baseboard 0.02 never-lived 0.03 new 0.02
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C Robustness Checks (Internet Appendix)
C.1 Positive and negative tokens
Although agents are hired to represent the seller, they have to be truthful in their marketing of the property.
Listing agents that market a landlocked property in disrepair as “immaculate with a dock” will develop a
poor reputation. Listing agents also know that prospective buyers may be looking for a fixer upper or are
willing to put in some sweat equity. Thus, if they mention these features in the textual description of the
property they will attract the right kind of buyer and increase the likelihood of a sale. Given that listing
agents only get paid if the property sells, they have an incentive to properly market the property. In addition,
the textual description of the property is often accompanied by photos which allows prospective buyers to
validate certain aspects of the property description from afar.
Table C1 examines the positive and negative informational content provided in the public remarks section
of the MLS using the occupied housing subsample. Columns 1 to 4 include the standard controls and time
by zip code fixed effects. Column 1 does not include the textual information. Column 2 includes both the
positive and negative tokens. Whereas column 3 (4) only includes the positive (negative) tokens. Columns
5 to 8 are set up similarly except for the use of multiplicatively separable time and census tract fixed effects.
The results show that both the positive and negative tokens address a portion of the omitted variable bias
present in the agent-owned estimates. The fact that the estimates are lower in columns 3 and 7 suggests
that the agents are more likely to include positive information about the house. Agents do, however, include
negative information about the house which, when included alongside the positive information, outperforms
the positive information on its own.
Table C1: Agent-owned estimates by token type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Atlanta 0.029∗∗ 0.014 0.017 0.030∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.018 0.020∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Phoenix 0.035∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 Sˆ
zip+
2 Sˆ
zip−
2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip+
2 Sˆ
zip−
2
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C.2 Heterogeneous subsamples
An agent’s informational advantage may vary across neighborhoods. As such, we examine whether the
agent-owned estimates vary by neighborhood composition. Income is often used as a proxy for education,
so its possible that agent’s enjoy a greater informational advantage in lower income neighborhoods relative
to higher income neighborhoods. Columns 1 to 4 in Table C2 examine whether agent-owned estimates vary
across income levels. The sample is divided into low and high income neighborhoods using the 2010 census
median income measure. Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates for the low income neighborhoods and columns
3 and 4 provide estimates for the high income neighborhoods. Even (odd) columns (do not) include the
textual information from the public remarks. The agent-owned estimates in Atlanta are insignificant when
the textual information is included. Whereas, the agent-owned estimates in Phoenix are significant for both
income levels. The results suggest that agent-owned houses sell for a higher premium (as a percent of sales
price) in lower income neighbhorhoods.
Levitt and Syverson (2008) note that the degree of heterogeneity in the housing stock may play a role in
the informational advantage that agents have. In neighborhoods where the housing stock is homogeneous,
sellers can accurately estimate their houses’ value by looking at recent sales nearby. However, if the housing
stock is heterogeneous, it will be more difficult for sellers to estimate the value of their own house. In columns
5 to 10 we proxy for neighbhorhood heterogeneity using the average difference in square feet of living area
within the census block group. Similar to Levitt and Syverson (2008), when the textual information is not
included in the model, we find that the sales price difference between agent-owned and non-agent-owned
houses is highest in neighborhoods that are more heterogeneous. However, after we incorporate the textual
information the difference is minimal. The results suggest that including the textual information in the asset
pricing model helps control for heterogeneous nature of the housing stock.
Table C2: Agent-owned estimates across heterogeneous subsamples
Income Heterogeneity
Low High Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Atlanta 0.018 −0.013 0.037∗∗∗ 0.016 0.022∗∗ 0.015 0.032∗ 0.019 0.038∗∗ 0.013
(0.020) (0.024) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Phoenix 0.054∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X X X X X X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip
2 Sˆ
zip
2
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C.3 Sample Selection
The agent-owned premium estimates we report use a sample of houses that were listed and successfully
sold on the MLS. They do not, however, incorporate information from houses that were listed on the MLS
that did not sell. To address this concern we use the Heckman (1979) selection correction method. The
selection correction model estimates a probit model using both sold and unsold records using a sold indicator
variable as the dependent variable. The probit estimation includes property controls and time by zip code
fixed effects. The probit results are used to construct an inverse Mills ration (IMR) that is included as an
additional control. The agent-owned estimates in Table C3 are similar to those reported using a specification
without the IMR.
Table C3: Selection correction agent-owned estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Atlanta 0.034∗∗ 0.018 0.026∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.021 0.025∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Phoenix 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls X X X X X X
IMR X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 L&S Sˆ
zip
2 L&S
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C.4 Two-stage least squares
There is a rich literature on the co-determination of sales price and time-on-market. In this section we
re-estimate the agent-owned premiums using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The first stage of
the 2SLS is a regression on time-on-market that includes a degree of overpricing covariate to address the
exclusive restriction. The 2SLS agent-owned estimates are reported in Table C4 for the occupied housing
subsample. Every column incorporates a set of controls that include the age of the house and indicator
variables for bedrooms, bathrooms, living area, and lot size. Columns 1 to 3 include time by zip code fixed
effects and columns 4 to 6 include time by census tract fixed effects. Columns 1 and 4 do not use any tokens.
Columns 2 and 5 use the unigram token set Sˆ2. Column 3 and 6 use the token set described in Levitt and
Syverson (2008). The estimates in Table C4 are similar to those reported using an OLS specification without
controlling for time-on-market.
Table C4: 2SLS agent-owned estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Atlanta 0.031∗∗ 0.015 0.023 0.033∗∗ 0.019 0.025∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Phoenix 0.037∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls X X X X X X
Time x Zip FE X X X
Time x Tract FE X X X
Tokens Sˆzip2 L&S Sˆ
tract
2 L&S
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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